NewExtend and pREITend: The maturity wall in the filings, and the signal that flags who sells nextRead more

Extend and pREITendThe maturity wall in the filings, and the signal that flags who sells next

In collaboration with
In collaboration with MSCI Real Capital Analytics
by Starboard Research6 min read
For a decade, REITs pushed their maturities out. That stopped in 2021, and the wall is now the steepest in thirteen years. Here we show that wall, dollar by dollar, from the original filings, as well as the signals that flag who sells next.

"Be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful." — Warren Buffett

"You've got to know when to hold, know when to fold up, know when to walk away, know when to run." — Not Warren Buffett

Every CRE acquisition team knows the fantasy: the phone call that lands a few weeks before a distressed REIT announces a disposition, the term sheet that arrives while competitors are still reading the press release.

The problem has never been identifying distress. Debt ratios, falling NOI and stress scores have flagged troubled REITs for decades. The problem is that distress tells you almost nothing about timing. Plenty of stressed REITs hold assets for years, and plenty of healthy ones sell constantly. The question that actually generates deal flow isn't who is in trouble? It's who is selling in the next few weeks below market?

Those are different questions, and they need different evidence. This piece walks through both halves: what the public filings already tell you about the pressure building on REIT balance sheets (every number below is live and you can push it around yourself), and then what it takes to turn that standing pressure into a timing signal.

Part one · the visible half

The pressure is on the public record

Every US equity REIT states exactly when its debt falls due. It sits in one footnote table of the 10‑K, shaped a little differently in every filing. Read all of them and you get the sector's maturity ladder: the clearest standing measure of who has to do something, and roughly when.

What that costs depends entirely on the rate it gets refinanced at. The exhibit below reprices it: choose a rate and a window, and every maturing dollar moves from the issuer's in-place rate to yours. Nothing else is assumed: no asset sales, no equity raise, no change in the debt balance.

Two things to read it correctly. The figure is a fully-repriced annual run rate, not next year's income statement: debt maturing in year three only starts costing more in year three. And the in-place rate is each issuer's whole-book average, interest expense over total debt, because the coupon on the specific tranche that is maturing is not something filings disclose. Since maturing debt is usually the older, cheaper debt, that makes every increase here a conservative one.

Maturity window
Debt repricing in window
$110B
36% of these issuers' dated debt
Added interest, once repriced
$2.7B/yr
on top of $12B of current annual interest
Interest bill increase
+23%
50 issuers priced · 6 without a tagged rate
When the debt comes due
Principal by calendar yearAlready came dueScheduled in the latest 10-K
$0$50B$100B$150Bfiled$13B2023$22B2024$23B2025$44B2026$45B2027$44B2028$48B2029$36B2030$134B2031+
Where the pain lands
Change in annual interest expense, biggest movers firstInterest bill risesFalls (in-place rate is higher)
no changeIRT+55%REXR+49%CPT+49%FR+47%TRNO+43%FRT+43%DOC+42%PSA+41%SPG+38%WPC+37%STAG+33%EQIX+33%CDP+33%CCI+30%largest 14 movers of 50 · full list in the table below
Show all issuers as a table
REITSectorDated debtDue in windowIn-place rateRate basisLadder taggedInterest exp.Added interestChangeDebt/assetsSource
PLDPrologis, Inc.$36B$6.7B2.82%ladder sum100%$1B$247M+25%36%10-K 2026-02-13
SPGSimon Property Group, Inc.$29B$12B3.41%ladder sum100%$975M$375M+38%72%10-K 2026-02-25
CCICrown Castle Inc.$24B$12B3.97%ladder sum100%$972M$292M+30%78%10-K 2026-02-23
WELLWelltower Inc.$19B$7.9Bnot tagged100%29%10-K 2026-02-12
EQIXEquinix, Inc.$19B$4.5B2.65%total debt tag96%$527M$174M+33%46%10-K 2026-02-11
VICIVici Properties Inc.$17B$5.3B4.94%ladder sum100%$844M$82M+10%35%10-K 2026-02-25
VTRVentas, Inc.$13B$5.4B4.67%ladder sum100%$612M$98M+16%44%10-K 2026-02-06
PSAPublic Storage$10B$3.5B2.95%ladder sum100%$304M$126M+41%51%10-K 2026-02-12
DOCHealthpeak Properties, Inc.$10B$3.6B2.93%total debt tag96%$305M$129M+42%46%10-K 2026-02-03
SBACSba Communications Corp$9.9B$6.4Bnot tagged77%85%10-K 2026-02-27
MPWMedical Properties Trust, Inc.$9.8B$3.6B5.19%ladder sum100%$510M$48M+9%67%10-K 2026-02-26
WPCW. P. Carey Inc.$8.8B$2.9B3.02%total debt tag99%$268M$99M+37%47%10-K 2026-02-11
INVHInvitation Homes Inc.$8.5B$4.4Bnot tagged99%46%10-K 2026-02-19
EQREquity Residential$8.2B$2.5B3.72%ladder sum100%$307M$70M+23%41%10-K 2026-02-13
DEIDouglas Emmett, Inc.$5.6B$2.9B4.77%ladder sum100%$267M$50M+19%60%10-K 2026-02-20
BRXBrixmor Property Group Inc.$5.5B$1.4B4.07%ladder sum100%$225M$33M+15%61%10-K 2026-02-09
AMHAmerican Homes 4 Rent$5.2B$500M3.59%ladder sum100%$185M$15M+8%39%10-K 2026-02-20
HSTHost Hotels & Resorts, Inc.$5.1B$1.5B4.57%ladder sum100%$235M$29M+12%39%10-K 2026-02-25
FRTFederal Realty Investment Trust$5B$2.8B3.70%ladder sum100%$184M$79M+43%55%10-K 2026-02-12
REGRegency Centers Corporation$4.8B$1.6Bnot tagged96%37%10-K 2026-02-13
OHIOmega Healthcare Investors, Inc.$4.3B$1.6B5.01%ladder sum100%$215M$23M+11%43%10-K 2026-02-09
SUISun Communities, Inc$4.3B$1.2B2.99%total debt tag58%$221M$43M+20%35%10-K 2026-02-25
SLGSl Green Realty Corp$4B$3.5B5.33%ladder sum100%$216M$41M+19%34%10-K 2026-02-17
RHPRyman Hospitality Properties, Inc.$4B$1.1B5.97%ladder sum100%$241M$6M+2%65%10-K 2026-02-24
CPTCamden Property Trust$3.9B$1.9B2.85%total debt tag81%$138M$68M+49%41%10-K 2026-02-12
PKPark Hotels & Resorts Inc.$3.9B$2.6B5.42%ladder sum100%$209M$28M+13%50%10-K 2026-02-20
PGREParamount Group, Inc.$3.7B$2.4B4.52%ladder sum$167M$48M+29%46%10-K 2025-02-27
HIWHighwoods Properties, Inc.$3.6B$1.2B4.27%ladder sum$152M$27M+17%54%10-K 2026-02-10
NSANational Storage Affiliates Trust$3.4B$1.4B4.75%total debt tag100%$162M$25M+16%68%10-K 2026-02-26
UDRUdr, Inc.$3.4B$1.6B3.47%total debt tag60%$197M$49M+25%33%10-K 2026-02-17
CUZCousins Properties Inc$3.4B$1.5B4.27%total debt tag90%$159M$33M+21%37%10-K 2026-02-05
ELSEquity Lifestyle Properties, Inc.$3.3B$685M3.91%ladder sum100%$131M$18M+14%58%10-K 2026-02-18
ADCAgree Realty Corporation$3.3B$781M3.50%total debt tag86%$135M$23M+17%31%10-K 2026-02-10
REXRRexford Industrial Realty, Inc.$3.3B$1.4B3.01%ladder sum100%$99M$49M+49%28%10-K 2026-02-11
STAGStag Industrial, Inc.$3.3B$1.2B3.46%ladder sum100%$113M$38M+33%45%10-K 2026-02-11
KRCKilroy Realty Corp$3.3B$850M3.89%ladder sum100%$126M$22M+18%30%10-K 2026-02-11
KRGKite Realty Group Trust$3B$1.1B4.38%ladder sum100%$133M$24M+18%48%10-K 2026-02-17
EPREpr Properties$3B$1.5B4.04%total debt tag90%$133M$36M+27%49%10-K 2026-02-26
CDPCopt Defense Properties$2.8B$841M3.10%ladder sum100%$87M$29M+33%62%10-K 2026-02-20
FRFirst Industrial Realty Trust, Inc.$2.6B$1.2B3.29%total debt tag99%$85M$40M+47%44%10-K 2026-02-11
BDNBrandywine Realty Trust$2.6B$1.2Bnot tagged98%71%10-K 2026-02-23
SBRASabra Health Care Reit, Inc.$2.6B$864M4.28%total debt tag97%$112M$19M+17%46%10-K 2026-02-12
JBGSJbg Smith Properties$2.5B$1.5B5.58%ladder sum100%$142M$13M+9%59%10-K 2026-02-17
OPIOffice Properties Income Trust$2.4B$1.2B8.37%ladder sum100%$203M−$22M−11%70%10-K 2026-05-22
PECOPhillips Edison & Company, Inc.$2.4B$705M3.96%total debt tag98%$97M$18M+18%44%10-K 2026-02-10
IRTIndependence Realty Trust, Inc.$2.3B$1.3B3.25%total debt tag93%$79M$44M+55%37%10-K 2026-02-17
PEBPebblebrook Hotel Trust$2.1B$1.2B4.82%ladder sum100%$103M$20M+19%41%10-K 2026-02-25
APLEApple Hospitality Reit, Inc.$1.5B$879Mnot tagged99%32%10-K 2026-02-23
XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts, Inc.$1.4B$534M6.04%ladder sum100%$87M$2M+3%53%10-K 2026-02-24
VREVeris Residential, Inc.$1.4B$1B6.50%total debt tag100%$89M−$0−0%51%10-K 2026-02-23
NHINational Health Investors, Inc.$1.2B$429M4.52%total debt tag93%$57M$9M+15%41%10-K 2026-02-26
DRHDiamondrock Hospitality Co$1.1B$05.71%ladder sum100%$63M$0+0%36%10-K 2026-02-27
CSRCenterspace$1.1B$375M4.26%ladder sum100%$45M$8M+19%57%10-K 2026-02-17
TRNOTerreno Realty Corporation$948M$473M3.47%ladder sum100%$33M$14M+43%17%10-K 2026-02-04
SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.$930M$170M5.55%total debt tag97%$53M$2M+3%31%10-K 2026-02-27
CTRECaretrust Reit, Inc.$900M$400M4.86%ladder sum100%$44M$7M+15%17%10-K 2026-02-12
Fig. 1The refinancing stress test. The grey columns are the run-up: principal that came due in 2023–2025, taken from the year-one rung of each year's opening 10-K: what the filings said was coming, not a measure of what was actually repaid. Drag the rate below about 4% and the sign flips: the biggest beneficiaries become the most distressed names, because they are the ones already paying the highest coupons. Issuers whose interest expense is not separately tagged have no in-place rate, so they appear in the maturity chart but not the repricing chart. Twelve issuers tag only part of their ladder; wherever a reported total-debt tag exists (22 of the 50 priced issuers, including all twelve partial ladders) the in-place rate is computed against it rather than the ladder sum, and the table shows which basis was used and how much of the ladder is tagged.
Part one, continued

A decade of pushing it out, and the year it stopped

A maturity ladder is only interesting against its own history. Rebuild it from the 10‑K of every year since 2013, holding the cohort fixed at the 32 REITs that filed a tagged ladder in all thirteen years so the trend isn't just composition, and the shape of the last cycle is unmistakable: refinancing risk was pushed steadily further out through the cheap-money years, bottoming in 2017, and has climbed every year since 2021.

Share due within three years
37.2%
4.12 yrs to maturity · $245B outstanding
The ladder as disclosed at FY2025
Principal due, by years from that balance-sheet date
$0$25B$50B$75B$100B$33B1 yr$29B2 yrs$28B3 yrs$33B4 yrs$25B5 yrs$96B6+ yrsfinal column combines every later year
Share due within three years
Constant cohort, so the trend is not composition
15%20%25%30%35%40%'13'16'19'22'25FY2017 trough37%
Show every vintage as a table
Filing yearREITsDebt outstandingDue within 3 yrsShareWeighted avg life
FY201332$121B$36B29.6%4.5 yrs
FY201432$123B$36B29.3%4.51 yrs
FY201532$135B$39B29.3%4.45 yrs
FY201632$132B$33B24.6%4.64 yrs
FY201732$153B$31B20.0%4.81 yrs
FY201832$157B$37B23.2%4.67 yrs
FY201932$167B$36B21.3%4.75 yrs
FY202032$182B$46B25.3%4.7 yrs
FY202132$190B$43B22.7%4.81 yrs
FY202232$206B$52B25.0%4.64 yrs
FY202332$220B$71B32.3%4.4 yrs
FY202432$225B$78B34.8%4.29 yrs
FY202532$245B$91B37.2%4.12 yrs
Fig. 2Drag through the vintages; click any point on the trend line to jump to it. Years to maturity is shown as a floor (≥) because the “6+” bucket is counted at exactly six years while holding 39–54% of the debt; the compression holds, and widens, under longer assumptions. The trend is not a tagging artifact: restricted to only those cohort ladders that tag the 6+ rung it runs 27.7% (FY2013) to 19.1% (FY2017) to 35.6% (FY2025), the same shape about 1.5pp lower.

Pressure alone still isn't a name on a call list, though. For that you have to put it against what each REIT is actually doing.

Part one, concluded

Who has to act, and who already is

Two numbers, both straight out of the filings, put every REIT in one of four positions. Up the side: how much of its dated debt falls due inside three years, the pressure to do something. Along the bottom: how much it actually sold for, as a share of its own balance sheet. Split each at the panel median and you get the four readings that matter to an acquisitions desk.

The interesting quadrant is not the busy one. A REIT selling hard from a comfortable maturity position is recycling capital, and it will run a competitive process. A REIT carrying a wall it has not started addressing is the one worth calling.

Disposal period
37 of 56 issuers tag disposal proceeds on this basis
Periods ending 2024-12-31 to 2025-12-31 · 22 of them also booked an impairment
Sold, no impairmentSold and wrote assets down
0.0%5.0%10%15%0%25%50%75%100%median 2.3%median 37%Capitulatingunder pressure and sellingCorneredunder pressure, not yet sellingRecyclingselling from a position of strengthHoldingno pressure, no disposalsPKADCKRGJBGSDisposal proceeds as a share of total assetsShare of total debt due within three years
Show the quadrant as a table
REITSectorDue in 3 yrsProceeds% of assetsPeriod endWrote downReading
SLGOffice87%$330M2.81%2025-12-31Capitulating
PKHotel66%$120M1.57%2025-12-31Cornered
JBGSOffice57%$545M12.57%2025-12-31$45MCapitulating
FRTRetail57%$306M3.36%2025-12-31$7MCapitulating
APLEHotel56%$72M1.47%2025-12-31$6MCornered
IRTMultifamily55%$158M2.59%2025-12-31$13MCapitulating
PEBHotel54%$103M1.95%2025-12-31$49MCornered
INVHSingle-family rental51%$498M2.70%2025-12-31$1MCapitulating
TRNOIndustrial50%$375M6.75%2025-12-31Capitulating
SBACData centre / Towers50%$331M2.82%2025-12-31Capitulating
OPIOffice49%$40M1.15%2025-12-31$2MCornered
EPRNet lease / Gaming45%$141M2.33%2025-12-31$52MCapitulating
CTREHealthcare44%$79M1.51%2025-12-31$2MCornered
REXRIndustrial43%$208M1.79%2025-12-31$89MCornered
SPGRetail42%$55M0.14%2024-12-31Cornered
NSASelf-storage42%$96M1.91%2025-12-31Cornered
VTRHealthcare41%$213M0.72%2025-12-31Cornered
XHRHotel37%$101M3.71%2025-12-31Capitulating
KRGRetail37%$722M11.52%2025-12-31$52MRecycling
MPWHealthcare37%$121M0.82%2025-12-31$180MHolding
OHIHealthcare36%$283M2.83%2025-12-31$23MRecycling
DOCHealthcare35%$338M1.56%2025-12-31$-1MHolding
PSASelf-storage34%$8M0.04%2025-12-31$4MHolding
HIWOffice33%$195M2.96%2025-12-31Recycling
WPCNet lease / Gaming32%$1.3B6.87%2025-12-31$70MRecycling
REGRetail32%$125M0.96%2025-12-31$5MHolding
VICINet lease / Gaming31%$6M0.01%2025-12-31Holding
EQRMultifamily30%$1.1B5.46%2025-12-31Recycling
CDPOffice30%$5M0.11%2025-12-31Holding
HSTHotel29%$125M0.95%2025-12-31$8MHolding
UDRMultifamily28%$374M3.62%2025-12-31Recycling
KRCOffice26%$448M4.16%2025-12-31$16MRecycling
ADCRetail20%$42M0.40%2025-12-31$12MHolding
PLDIndustrial19%$2.2B2.29%2025-12-31Holding
SUIManufactured housing17%$162M1.31%2025-12-31$1MHolding
AMHSingle-family rental10%$630M4.80%2025-12-31Recycling
DRHHotel0%$89M2.90%2025-12-31$1MRecycling
Fig. 3The capitulation quadrant. One dot per REIT; the amber dots booked an impairment in their latest full financial year, the issuer's own statement that assets are worth less than it carries them at, which is as close as a public filing gets to selling at a discount; impairments stay annual in both views even when the disposal period is a quarter. The vertical axis is near-term maturities over total debt, so a partially tagged ladder cannot distort it. Dividing lines are the panel medians, so the split is self-calibrating rather than a threshold we chose.

And this is where the public record runs out. It tells you the pressure is real, rising and unevenly distributed, and it tells you who has and hasn't moved. It cannot tell you what any one of these REITs will do next month, which is the only thing an acquisitions desk is actually paid to know.

Part two · the timing signal

Distress is a level. Selling is an event.

Everything in Part one is a level. It describes standing pressure, and standing pressure is not a date. Traditional REIT tracking has the same shape: quarterly filings tell you what happened three months ago, stress scores measure past performance, and almost none of it is built to answer when. The question that matters is the when: not how distressed is this REIT but what is the probability this REIT sells an asset in the next thirty days.

That is a forecasting problem, and it rests on two observations.

The market moves first

The equity market is a prediction machine. Investors sell REIT shares before the REIT announces asset sales, pricing in the earnings misses, dividend pressure and covenant strain management hasn't disclosed yet. A stock falling hard against the index is the market saying something the filings won't say for another quarter, and relative stock performance leads disposition announcements by weeks.

Selling comes in waves

REITs in disposition mode sell in waves, not one-offs: a sale in the last thirty days raises the odds of another in the next thirty. On its own that is ambiguous, because healthy REITs transact constantly too, which is exactly what Figure 3 shows. Crossed with stock underperformance it stops being ambiguous, and that interaction is what separates a fire sale from routine portfolio rotation.

The model

A panel of 87 public REITs observed fortnightly through time, each observation labelled with whether that REIT sold anything in the following thirty days, and a gradient boosting classifier trained on transaction-behaviour and stock-performance features. It scores every REIT in the universe and outputs one number: the probability of a sale inside the window.

Panel
11,397 observations, fortnightly
REITs
87
Features per observation
32
Prediction window
30 days
Observation span
2020-01-01 to 2024-12-25
Base rate
12.25% sold in the next 30 days
Validated on a held-out sample
Gradient boosting, depth 10 · Held-out sample0.6221.93× lift
Gradient boosting, depth 3 · Held-out sample0.6021.58× lift

ROC-AUC on a randomized 80/20 held-out sample (2,280 observations). Lift is the top-ranked decile's hit rate against the 12.25% base rate. Run 2026-08-04.

A 1.9× lift means the top-ranked decile of observations sold at nearly twice the base rate: a ranked outreach queue, refreshed weekly, with the features that flagged each name attached.

The call sheet

One name per sector

Put the two halves together and you can already draft the first call sheet. Within each sector, take the REIT with the heaviest near-term wall among those that have also written assets down: the filings' own two-signal proxy for the seller most likely to accept a discount in the next few months. Two sectors put no name forward under that rule, which is a finding in itself.

SectorREITDebt due inside 3 yrsImpairment bookedSold, latest full year
OfficeJBGSJbg Smith Properties57%$45M$545M
RetailFRTFederal Realty Investment Trust57%$7M$306M
HotelAPLEApple Hospitality Reit, Inc.56%$6M$72M
MultifamilyIRTIndependence Realty Trust, Inc.55%$13M$158M
Single-family rentalINVHInvitation Homes Inc.51%$1M$498M
Data centre / TowersCCICrown Castle Inc.47%$11M
Net lease / GamingEPREpr Properties45%$52M$141M
HealthcareCTRECaretrust Reit, Inc.44%$2M$79M
IndustrialREXRRexford Industrial Realty, Inc.43%$89M$208M

2 of 11 sectors put no name forward under this rule (manufactured housing, self-storage): no issuer there combines an above-median wall with a booked impairment.

Fig. 4The sector shortlist, from the filings alone. In each sector: the issuer with the largest share of dated debt due inside three years, among those that booked an impairment in their latest full financial year, shown only where that share clears the panel median. This is the standing-pressure read; the timing model re-ranks it as prices and transactions move.

If one of these names sits inside your mandate, give us a call. We run the timing model across the full REIT universe every week, and we can show you which of that REIT's properties best fits your demonstrated investment thesis, before the process starts.

Data through FY2025 10‑K filings. Source: SEC XBRL companyfacts API (data.sec.gov). 92 REIT filers pulled; 56 equity REITs with a machine-readable ladder in their latest 10‑K, in-place rate for 50 of them. Median in-place rate 4.26%. Built 4 August 2026. Figures are as-filed and not adjusted for events after each balance-sheet date. Transaction data underlying the timing signal courtesy of MSCI Real Capital Analytics. Header photograph: the Rosslyn skyline from Hains Point, by Wei Feng on Unsplash.

See it in action for your own firm

Bring a live deal. We'll ingest it during the call and you can ask it anything.

Request a demo